Combat Drones in Action: What can India's Defence Forces Learn from Recent Wars

Published by Amit Kalra on 29th Aug 2025

Drones are no longer niche tools - they’re a system-of-systems problem. Airframes matter, but sensors, data links, autonomy, and jamming decide who sees first and strikes accurately, while counter-unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) must be planned the same way - layered, mobile, and affordable. India’s own experience around Operation Sindoor, alongside recent conflicts, shows how quickly the fight shifts from platform choice to integration: intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) feeding fire control, hardened communications surviving electronic warfare (EW), and interceptors matched to threat tiers. It boils down to some crucial questions for Indian defence, what to field now, what to harden, and where to scale industry without chasing hype.

The rapid evolution of drone technology in recent global events also provides critical insights for India's technology and manufacturing sectors. As a supplier of components to drone manufacturers, Evelta recognizes the importance of understanding how drone technology is advancing globally, from commercial applications to defence requirements. This analysis, based on publicly available information only, examines recent developments to help Indian manufacturers and suppliers prepare for emerging technical requirements and market opportunities.

While this piece focuses more on tactical lessons from recent conflicts and their implications for defence readiness, we'll explore the Indian drone ecosystem - emerging startups, DRDO programs, market opportunities, and indigenous development initiatives - in a detailed follow-up article.

Operation Sindoor and the Tactical Shift in Indian Drone Use

"Our battle-proven systems stood the test of time and take them head on. Another highlight has been the stellar performance of the indigenous air defence system, the Akash system." — Air Marshal AK Bharti, Director General Air Operations, Indian Air Force

On May 7, 2025 (IST), the Indian Air Force conducted airstrikes on nine locations between 1:05–1:30 a.m. IST inside Pakistan and PoK - Operation Sindoor - the first such cross-IB strikes since 1971, according to Carnegie’s analysis. Operation Sindoor became a turning point in India's military history that showed an advanced combination of unmanned systems and standoff weapons in a measured response operation. This action came after terrorists killed 26 civilians in Pahalgam. The Indian military's response marked a major change in drone warfare doctrine and set new standards for future conflicts in the region.

Use of UAVs and standoff weapons in Pahalgam response

The Indian military responded to the Pahalgam attack with precise and restrained coordinated strikes. Israeli Heron MK-II and indigenous TAPAS-BH-201/Rustom-II Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) drones conducted reconnaissance missions in the 48 hours before Operation Sindoor. These missions gathered vital electronic and signals intelligence about suspected terrorist camps. A combined force of Rafale fighters, Sukhoi-30MKIs, and Mirage-2000 aircraft then delivered SCALP missiles and BrahMos supersonic weapons for surgical strikes.

The defence Ministry stated, "Our actions have been focused, measured and non-escalatory in nature. No Pakistani military facilities have been targeted". India's evolving defence doctrine emphasizes "jointness" – coordinated use of capabilities across multiple domains. The strikes targeted specific terrorist infrastructure, including Jaish-e-Mohammed's base in Bahawalpur and Lashkar-e-Taiba's hub in Muridke. This sent a clear message that India rejects nuclear coercion as protection for state-sponsored terrorism.

Role of Indian drones in neutralizing threats

Indian drones served as the operation's foundation and performed surveillance and strike missions with exceptional accuracy. The military used loitering munitions, also known as "suicide drones" or "kamikaze drones," extensively. These drones hovered over target areas, identified threats, and engaged them while minimizing collateral damage. The arsenal combined indigenous systems like the Nagastra-1, which carries a 1.5 kg explosive payload up to 15 km, with Israeli-origin Harop drones that autonomously target enemy radar systems.

The operation used a multi-layered drone strategy:

Intelligence gathering: Heron drones provided immediate surveillance and target acquisition
Electronic warfare: Decoy/loitering profiles and EW measures; details on saturation effects remain limited in public sources.
Precision strikes: Loitering munitions delivered surgical hits on terrorist infrastructure
Battle damage assessment: Quadcopters and micro-UAVs relayed live feeds to command centers

According to Indian media and defence outlets, a Harop strike allegedly targeted and hit a Chinese-origin HQ-9 system near Lahore. However, India has not released an official battle damage assessment, and the claim remains unverified pending independent confirmation.

Lessons from Pakistan's Response

Pakistan’s counter-move, designated Operation Bunyan-ul-Marsoos, reportedly employed multiple drone platforms between May 7–10, including indigenous Shahpar-II MALE UAVs, armed Burraq drones, Turkish-origin Bayraktar TB2s, and Chinese-supplied systems - though exact numbers and platform mixes remain disputed across open-source and contemporaneous media reports.

The exchange highlighted core technical challenges in modern drone warfare. India’s multi-layered air-defence grid - Akash surface-to-air missile batteries networked via Akashteer C2 - underscored the importance of integrated counter-UAS. Public specifications for Akash note the ability to track up to 64 targets and engage up to 12 simultaneously, illustrating the sensor-fusion and fire-control integration that contemporary C-UAS demands.

Layered defence outperforms single-point solutions
Tight radar-to-shooter integration (C2) is decisive
EW/jamming heavily shapes the effectiveness of both attack and defence
Redundancy and saturation planning matter on both sides

A crucial takeaway: defensive drone systems matter as much as offensive capacity. As Chief of Defence Staff Gen. Anil Chauhan noted of the May 10 attacks, "none of them could actually inflict any damage” on Indian infrastructure - a result achieved through a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic measures.

Global Drone Warfare Case Studies: Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Myanmar

Drone warfare has changed the battlefield landscape over the last several years. Three conflicts serve as case studies that show how unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have changed modern warfare. These examples teach practical lessons about tactical breakthroughs, budget-friendly warfare, and adapting technology that could help shape the defence Ministry of India's future military drone strategy.

FPV drones in Ukraine's Operation Spider Web

On June 1, 2025, Ukraine’s SBU executed ‘Operation Spider’s Web’, a coordinated 117-drone strike against at least four Russian air bases, with officials claiming 41 aircraft hit and damage estimates in the $2–7B range; satellite imagery in follow-ups confirmed multiple bombers destroyed.

Ukraine's technical approach brought new breakthroughs. They used First-Person View (FPV) drones that sent immediate video feeds through goggles or headsets like VR gaming. These drones worked through mobile networks instead of traditional military satellite networks to avoid jamming. Ukrainian forces also moved drones in civilian trucks and used artificial intelligence to spot weak points on target aircraft.

Loitering munitions in the Nagorno-Karabakh War

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia shows how loitering munitions - often called "kamikaze drones" - can change military power dynamics. Over a 44-day period in 2020, Azerbaijan’s use of TB2s and Harops was prominently documented in verified strike footage and subsequent analyses. Studies by CSIS and others underscore that these drones played a pivotal role as part of a wider strike and ISR ecosystem.

These weapons worked best against high-value targets. Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 showed it could do many things at once. It provided identification and targeting data while carrying smart micro-guided munitions. Azerbaijan's smart use of these drones helped neutralize Armenian tanks, fighting vehicles, artillery units, and air defences.

Armenia's outdated air defence systems exposed a major weakness. Their 2K11 Krug, 9K33 Osa, 2K12 Kub, and 9K35 Strela-10 systems could not detect or stop the relatively small TB2 drones flying above their reach. Even Armenia's larger S-300 air defence systems, which weren't built to fight UAVs, fell prey to Azerbaijan's loitering munitions.

3D-printed drones by Myanmar rebel groups

Myanmar's rebel groups have shown amazing breakthroughs by making their own drones with limited resources. A computer technology graduate known as "3D" created the Liberator-MK1 and better MK2 drones, taking inspiration from Ukraine's Punisher drone. Open-source reports identify a designer known as ‘3D’ who produces Liberator-series 3D-printed drones for resistance units. These reports indicate an estimated cost of about $5,000 per airframe and an assembly time of roughly two days once parts are in-country, with payload capacities commonly cited at around 1.5 kg.

This tech adaptation helps Myanmar's rebel groups fight against the military junta's superior firepower. While rebels find it hard to get simple munitions, Myanmar's military has bought weaponry worth at least ₹84.38 billion since the 2021 coup. These drones give rebels a unique advantage to attack military command centers and outposts despite having fewer conventional resources.

Counter-Drone Systems and Their Limitations

"Our counter-UAS, our trained air defence operators are fully capable and our indigenous capabilities have demonstrated that whichever technology may come, we are prepared to counter." — Air Marshal AK Bharti, Director General Air Operations, Indian Air Force

The battlefield has seen a rise in combat drones, and counter-drone technologies are now crucial for modern defence systems. These systems face major challenges in the fast-changing world of unmanned aerial warfare.

Electronic warfare and jamming vulnerabilities

Electronic warfare leads the front in drone defence. Indian forces employed EW/jamming techniques to disrupt communication between drones and operators. In spite of that, these methods have clear limits. Standard jamming works on radio-controlled drones that use predictable frequency bands but struggles with advanced systems. The Royal United Services Institute reports Ukraine loses approximately 10,000 drones monthly from jamming. Modern military drones now use frequency-hopping features that make jamming harder.

Small drones flying at low altitudes are exceptionally hard to detect or stop. Urban areas block line-of-sight, which makes drone detection and interception more difficult. The success of counter-drone systems changes based on where they operate and how sophisticated the drones are.

Soft-kill and hard-kill C-UAS in Indian defence

The Indian Army stepped up its efforts to improve its counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS) capabilities. An April 2025 RFI sought ~75 platform-mounted C-UAS systems (T-72/T-90), underscoring the push to harden armor against FPV threats. Soft-kill methods use non-kinetic approaches like jamming or spoofing drone communications. Hard-kill methods use kinetic countermeasures such as projectiles or directed-energy weapons.

Bharat Electronics Limited created detailed solutions including the "Anti-Drone System Soft & Hard kill" that gives multi-sensor protection against unmanned aerial threats. These systems have active phased array radar with 360-degree azimuth coverage and elevation coverage from -5 to 50 degrees. The system detects nano RPAs with 0.001 radar cross-section at 2 km and larger drones up to 8 km away.

AI helps drones dodge traditional counter-measures. Today's drones use dynamic communication channel adaptation. They jump between frequencies to avoid jamming. Advanced UAVs switch to inertial navigation systems (INS) when GPS jamming happens. These systems mix internal compass and gyroscope functions so drones can fly "blind" on pre-programmed routes.

The Indian Army wants technology to stop drones guided by multiple satellite navigation systems like GPS, GLONASS, BeiDou, Galileo, and IRNSS. These systems need both jamming and spoofing capabilities with a 2 km effective range.

Fiber-optic tethering to bypass jamming

Fibre-optic–guided FPVs remove the radio link and are therefore immune to RF jamming while greatly reducing the platform’s electronic signature. However, they are not “invisible”: they can still be detected and defeated by visual, infrared, acoustic, or kinetic means, and the tether introduces trade-offs (spool management, snag risk, limited reach, added operator workload). In practice, fibre-optic FPVs complicate electronic attack and enable precise terminal guidance, but they do not negate the need for layered counter-UAS measures - radar/EO cueing, rapid fire-control, physical barriers, and point-defence effectors.

Commercial Drone Tech in Military Operations

Commercial innovation is now a first-class input to combat capability. Recent conflicts show a two-way flow between civilian drone ecosystems and military use, with clear lessons for India’s defence manufacturers on cost, speed, and integration.

Military–commercial crossover in drone design

Ukraine’s deep-strike Operation Spiderweb demonstrated how “civilian stack” components can be adapted for long-range effects: open-source autopilot software like ArduPilot was reported on the drones that hit multiple Russian air bases, with post-strike assessments counting dozens of aircraft damaged or destroyed (Business Insider). On the low-cost end, first-person-view (FPV) “kamikaze” quadcopters assembled from commercial parts often cost about US$300–$500, enabling saturation tactics against far more expensive targets (Ukrainian industry reporting).

Implication: prioritise components - electronic speed controllers (ESCs), motors, radio-frequency (RF) modules, Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)/inertial measurement units (IMUs), payload interfaces - that interoperate with hobby-to-pro control stacks and can be ruggedised for heat, dust, and field repair.

Open-source software and modular engineering

Open-source flight stacks such as ArduPilot and PX4 compress iteration cycles by reusing mature code for navigation, stabilization, and failsafes - an approach seen again in Spiderweb coverage. Modular airframes and payload bays let units swap sensors - electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) - and communications gear with minimal redesign, shortening time from concept to combat.

Implication: support standard buses/protocols - Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter (UART), Controller Area Network (CAN), Micro Air Vehicle Link (MAVLink) - and test for electronic warfare (EW) resilience, including GNSS-denied navigation and seamless link handover.

Additive manufacturing for rapid production

Militaries are moving to print airframes and spares close to the fight. The U.S. Army’s Rock Island Arsenal – Joint Manufacturing and Technology Center (RIA-JMTC) describes efforts to scale 3D-printed drone production across the organic industrial base (army.mil). In theatre, flat-packed airframes such as SYPAQ’s Corvo PPDS (“cardboard drones”) have been supplied to Ukraine for logistics/ISR assembly near the front (PPDS overview).

Implication: design printable airframe parts (jigs, fairings, antenna mounts), specify materials that retain rigidity in heat/dust, and document simple field-assembly and repair procedures to cut logistics friction.

Weaponisation of off-the-shelf unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)

Non-state actors like the Islamic State (ISIS) institutionalised the weaponisation of consumer drones - often using simple drop devices for 40 mm grenades - before state forces professionalised the approach (CTC at West Point). The ensuing EW arms race has pushed innovation into fibre-optic-guided FPVs that bypass radio-frequency jamming and into AI-assisted “lock-on/track” navigation now seen in combat reporting (Forbes).

Implication: offer EW-hardened links (frequency agility, high-power analog/digital, optional fibre), anti-jamming navigation (visual-inertial odometry, terrain-aided), and swap-in payload modules (release units, shaped charges, explosively formed penetrators - EFPs) subject to export controls.

Strategic Roadmap for India’s Drone Resilience

India needs a complete strategic roadmap for drone resilience based on lessons from recent conflicts. This plan should address both current and future defence requirements. Global conflicts where UAVs played key roles give great insights to boost India's capabilities.

Scale what matters

India should focus on a small set of priority unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and counter-UAS (C-UAS): first-person-view attack drones, loitering munitions, small intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance platforms, and their detectors, jammers, and interceptors. Standardising basic connectors, power, and software handshakes will let multiple vendors supply interchangeable parts without redesigning the whole drone.

Build surge capacity close to the field

Distributed “make and mend” hubs can raise output quickly and cut downtime. These can be set up inside existing depots or private clusters with 3D printers, light machining, and electronics benches. Pre-packed kits, jig files, and short test checklists help units assemble or repair drones at tempo.

Reducing dependency on foreign UAV components

Supply-chain disruptions create strategic weak points when airframes rely on imported microprocessors, imaging sensors, radio-frequency front-ends, navigation systems, and lithium cells. Increasing domestic production of selected high-risk components - and designing “drop-in” alternatives where imports remain necessary - will reduce vulnerability over time.

Procurement and integration - Role of the Ministry of Defence (MoD)

Procurement that moves in small, iterative tranches - with timely approvals, competitive participation including the private sector, and an emphasis on system compatibility - can improve readiness across all services. Open interfaces make it easier to plug UAS and C-UAS into command-and-control systems and unit-level devices, and to field improvements without long delays.

Conclusion

India’s lesson from Operation Sindoor and recent wars is not that “drones changed everything,” but that integration wins - sensors, links, EW, and interceptors working as one cycle under pressure. The May 7–10 exchange showed what disciplined defence can do; while public remarks from Indian side reported no damage, this should be treated as a mandate to harden, not to coast.

For India’s drone ecosystem, the recurring theme from our customer interactions is 'ease' - ease of combining parts, of understanding behavior, and of planning supply. Teams tell us they value parts that “just fit together” (familiar connectors, mounting points, simple data interfaces), a short note about how links typically perform and what happens when GPS is weak, and a few small proofs rather than long brochures - e.g., a snippet of basic EMI/EMC or heat/vibration checks, a brief log from a poor-signal test. It also helps when lead times and second-source options are visible, when key modules can be swapped in the field, and when quick-start docs, pinouts, and CAD files are easy to find. None of this dictates a design; it simply lowers integration risk so customers can move faster with you.

Key Takeaways

India's defence forces are rapidly adapting to the drone warfare revolution, drawing critical lessons from global conflicts to strengthen national security capabilities.

Integration wins. Sensors, links, EW, and interceptors working together beat any single “hero” platform.
Cost asymmetry is real but fragile. Cheap FPV/loitering drones can hit expensive targets, until links fail under jamming.
Civil-Military partnership is a two-way street. Rapid adaptation flows both ways, commercial parts, open tooling and 3D printing accelerate capability and counter-capability cycles.

One edge matters: scale what works and learn faster than the threat.